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Abstract— According to the DeGroot-Friedkin model of a
social network, an individual’s social power evolves as the
network discusses individual opinions over a sequence of issues.
Under mild assumptions on the connectivity of the network, the
social power of every individual converges to a constant strictly
positive value as the number of issues discussed increases. If the
network has a special topology, termed “star topology”, then
all social power accumulates with the individual at the centre
of the star. This paper studies the strategic introduction of
new individuals and/or interpersonal relationships into a social
network with star topology to reduce the social power of the
centre individual. In fact, several strategies are proposed. For
each strategy, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions on
the strength of the new interpersonal relationships, based on
local information, which ensures that the centre individual no
longer has the greatest social power within the social network.
Interpretations of these conditions show that the strategies are
remarkably intuitive and that certain strategies are favourable
compared to others, all of which is sociologically expected.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the systems and control community has
turned to study of networked systems and multi-agent sys-
tems in the context of social sciences. Of particular interest
are social networks, where groups of people interact with
acquaintances through interpersonal relationships.
One problem of “opinion dynamics” has been of particular
interest; how do the opinions of individuals for a given issue
evolve as they discuss this issue in a social network? A
recent survey on opinion dynamics is presented in [1]. An
important aspect of opinion dynamics is social power, which
in one sense can be considered as the weight/power/influence
an individual has on the opinion discussion, relative to the
weight/power/influence of the other individuals in the social
network. This relativity arises due to interpersonal relation-
ships and their strengths (which may be unidirectional).
This concept is studied in the seminal works [2], [3]. The
evolution of social power is studied in [4]. The paper [5]
studies the case where multiple, interdependent issues are
simultaneously discussed. Selecting the most influential in-
dividual in social diffusion models is studied in [6]. A social
network with stubborn individuals who remain attached to
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their initial opinions is studied in [7], [8]. The centralised
DeGroot-Friedkin model for the evolution of social power
is proposed and analysed in [9]. Distributed discrete- and
continuous-time DeGroot-Friedkin models are studied in [10]
and [11] respectively.
According to French Jr. and Snyder in [12], “leadership
is the potential social influence of one part of the group
over another.” From the perspective of opinion dynamics,
a leader can therefore be seen as an individual or a group
of individuals that has a disproportionate amount of control
over the opinion discussion process. In the context of social
power, one can therefore refer to a leader/leader group as the
socially dominant individual/group of individuals. The fact
that social power tends to accumulate with one individual
or a subgroup of individuals in a social network is reported
empirically in [4] and theoretically in [9]. This individual
or subgroup is defined explicitly by the interpersonal rela-
tionships in the social network. Motivated by this concept of
social dominance/leadership, and using the DeGroot-Friedkin
model to describe the social network, we begin with network
topologies which have a single socially dominant individual,
and seek to study control strategies, including introduction
of new individuals into the network and/or establishment of
new interpersonal relationships, that will cause the social
dominance to shift to another individual. We now introduce
the DeGroot-Friedkin model to better motivate the formal
problem statement which follows in the sequel. In order to
allow readers to quickly grasp the concepts of the new model
and understand the motivations, in the following subsection,
where possible we leave out definitions and exact mathemat-
ical results; these will be included in Section II. The terms
“self-weight”, “individual social power” and “social power”
will be used interchangeably.
A. The DeGroot-Friedkin Model
The discrete-time DeGroot-Friedkin model comprises a
consensus model for describing the opinion dynamics (details
are given below) and a mechanism for updating self-weights
(the weight an individual applies to its own opinion value
in the consensus process). We define S = {0, 1, 2, . . .} to
be the set of indices of sequential issues which are being
discussed by the social network. For a given issue s, the
social network discusses the issue using the discrete-time
DeGroot consensus model (with constant weights throughout
the discussion of the issue). At the end of the discussion
(i.e. when the DeGroot model has effectively reached steady
state), each individual reflects upon, and judges its impact
on the discussion. This mechanism is termed reflected self-
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appraisal, with “reflection” referring to the fact that adjust-
ments to weights are made after discussion on an issue. The
individual then updates its own self-weight and discussion
begins on the next issue s + 1 (using the same consensus
model but now with adjusted weights). We now explain
the mathematical modelling of the mechanism for updating
opinions within an issue, and the updating of self-weights
from one issue to the next.
1) DeGroot Consensus of Opinions: For each issue s ∈ S,
each individual updates its opinion yi(s, ·) ∈ R at time t+ 1
as
yi(s, t+ 1) = wii(s)yi(s, t) +
n∑
j 6=i
wij(s)yj(s, t) (1)
where wii(s) is the self-weight individual i places on its own
opinion and wij is the weight given by agent i to the opinion
of its neighbour individual j. As will be made apparent in
the sequel,
∑n
j=1 wij = 1, which implies that individual i’s
new opinion value yi(s, t + 1) is a convex combination of
its own opinion, and the opinions of its neighbours at the
current time instant. The opinion dynamics for the entire
social network may be expressed as
y(s, t+ 1) = W (s)y(s, t) (2)
where y(s, t) = [y1(s, t) · · · yn(s, t)]> is the vector of
opinions of the n + 1 agents in the network at time instant
t. This model was studied in [3] with S = {0} (i.e. only
one issue was discussed). The dynamics of (2), and the
graphical conditions required for opinions to converge, have
been well studied. Next, we describe the model for the
updating of W (s) (specifically wii(s) via a reflected self-
appraisal mechanism that occurs at the end of discussion of
an issue s). For simplicity, we assume that each individual’s
opinion, yi(s, t), is a scalar. Kronecker products may be used
if each individual’s opinion state is a vector yi ∈ Rp, p ≥ 2.
2) Friedkin’s Self-Appraisal Model for Determining Self-
Weight: The Friedkin component of the model proposes
a method for updating the self-weight (individual social
power, self-confidence or self-esteem) of individual i, which
is denoted by xi(s) = wii(s) ∈ [0, 1] (the ith diagonal term
of W (s)) [9]. Define the vector x(s) = [x1(s) · · · xn(s)]>
as the vector of self-weights for the individuals of the social
network, with starting self-weight 0 ≤ xi(0) ≤ 1 satisfying∑
i xi(0) = 1. The self-weight vector x(s) is updated at the
end of issue s as
x(s+ 1) = ζ(s) (3)
where ζ(s)> is the unique nonnegative left eigenvector of
W (s) associated with the eigenvalue 1, normalised such
that 1>n ζ(s) = 1, see [9]. When individual i adjusts its
value of wii(s) = xi(s), it necessarily must adjust the
weights wij(s), j 6= i to maintain
∑n
j=1 wij = 1. The
precise structure of W (s), and its properties giving rise to
the existence of ζ(s)>, will be provided in the sequel. See
Remark 1 in Section II-B for comments on the motivation
for this update mechanism. Convergence properties will be
presented in the sequel, but under mild assumptions on the
social network topology, it is shown that lims→∞ ζ(s)> =
x∗ where x∗ is the constant vector of social power at
equilibrium.
B. Contributions
In order to simplify the problem of achieving change of a
socially dominant leader, we will only consider social power
at equilibrium x∗ in this paper. It was shown in [9] that if
the social network has a specific topology termed the star
topology, all social power at equilibrium accumulates with
a single individual k as issues are sequentially discussed,
in an “autocratic configuration”. In this paper, we show
that by strategic introduction of new individuals and/or
new interpersonal relationships into the social network, not
only is the autocratic configuration broken but if the new
relationship is sufficiently strong, other identifiable individ-
ual(s) will have social power at equilibrium greater than
individual k. Specifically, we derive necessary and sufficient
conditions based on local information for the relationship
strength. This is in contrast to many control strategies on
networked systems which rely on global information [13],
[14]. In fact, a number of different strategies are considered.
We also propose a strategy whereby two socially dominant
individuals in separate networks can combine their networks
and together remain socially dominant.
While the results are initially presented mathematically as
inequalities, we provide detailed analysis and interpretation.
In doing so, we show that the strategies are remarkably intu-
itive and precisely what one would expect when considered
from a sociological context. The fact that the strategies affect
the social power of individuals in a social network which is
sequentially discussing issues implies that we have devel-
oped control strategies for affecting/influencing the opinion
dynamics process.
C. Paper Structure
In Section II, we provide notations, an introduction to
graph theory, and convergence results for the DeGroot-
Friedkin model. At the same time, a formal problem state-
ment is given. The main results are presented in Section III.
Simulations are presented in Section IV and conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND FORMAL PROBLEM STATEMENT
We begin by introducing some mathematical notations
used in the paper. Let 1n and 0n denote, respectively, the
n× 1 column vectors of all ones and all zeros. For a vector
x ∈ Rn, 0  x and 0 ≺ x indicate component-wise
inequalities, i.e., for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, 0 ≤ xi and 0 < xi,
respectively. Let ∆n denote the n-simplex, the set which
satisfies {x ∈ Rn : 0  x,1>nx = 1}. The canonical basis of
Rn is given by e1, . . . , en. Define ∆˜n = ∆n\{e1, . . . , en}
and int(∆n) = {x ∈ Rn : 0 ≺ x,1>nx = 1}. For the rest
of the paper, we shall use the terms “node”, “agent”, and
“individual” interchangeably.
A. Graph Theory
The interaction between individuals in a social network
is modelled using a weighted directed graph, denoted as
G = (V, E). Each individual agent is a node in the finite,
nonempty set of nodes V = {v1, . . . , vn}. The set of ordered
edges is E ⊆ V × V . We denote an ordered edge as
eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E , and because the graph is directed, in
general eij and eji may not both exist. An edge eij is said
to be outgoing with respect to vi and incoming with respect
to vj . The presence of an edge eij connotes that individual
j learns of, and takes into account, the opinion value of
individual i when updating its own opinion. The incoming
and outgoing neighbour set of vi are respectively defined as
N+i = {vj ∈ V : eji ∈ E} and N−i = {vj ∈ V : eij ∈ E}.
The relative interaction matrix C ∈ Rn×n associated with
G has nonnegative entries cij , termed “relative interpersonal
weights” in [9]. The entries of C have properties such that
0 < cij ≤ 1 ⇔ eji ∈ E and cij = 0 otherwise. It is
assumed that cii = 0 (i.e. with no self-loops), and we impose
the restriction that
∑
j∈N+i cij = 1 (i.e. that C is a row-
stochastic matrix).
A directed path is a sequence of edges of the form
(vp1 , vp2), (vp2 , vp3), . . . where vpi ∈ V, eij ∈ E . Node i is
reachable from node j if there exists a directed path from vj
to vi. A graph is said to be strongly connected if every node
is reachable from every other node. The relative interaction
matrix C is irreducible if and only if the associated graph G
is strongly connected (C is known in some literature as the
weighted adjacency matrix). If C is irreducible then it has a
unique (up to a scaling) left eigenvector γ>, with all entries
strictly positive, associated with the eigenvalue 1 (Perron-
Frobenius Theorem, see [15]). Henceforth, we shall call this
left eigenvector γ> the dominant left eigenvector of C and
assume that γ> has been normalised such that it has the
property γ>1n = 1.
B. Convergence Results for the DeGroot-Friedkin Model
We now provide additional, specific details on the model.
For a given issue, the influence matrix W (s) is defined as
follows
W (s) = X(s) + (In −X(s))C (4)
where C is the relative interaction matrix associated with
the graph G, and the matrix X(s) .= diag[x(s)]. From
the fact that C is row-stochastic with zero diagonal entries,
(4) implies that W (s) is a row-stochastic matrix. Note that
ζ(s)>1n = 1 implies that x(s) ∈ ∆n for all s. From (4) and
the fact that C is constant, it is apparent that by adjusting
wii(s+ 1) = ζi(s), individual i also scales wij(s+ 1), j 6= i
by (1− wii(s+ 1)) in order to maintain the row-stochastic
property of W (s).
Remark 1 (Social Power). The precise motivation behind
using (3) as the updating model for x(s) is detailed in
[9], but we provide a brief overview here in the interest of
making this paper self-contained. The definition of W in (4)
ensures that, for any given s, there holds limt→∞ y(s, t) =
(ζ(s)>y(s, 0))1n. In other words, for any given issue s, the
opinions of every individual in the social network reach a
consensus value ζ(s)>y(s, 0) equal to a convex combination
of their initial opinion values y(s, 0). The elements of w(s)>
are the convex combination coefficients, i.e. ζi(s) represents
precisely the amount of weight/power that individual i had
on the opinion discussion for issue s. For a given issue s,
ζi(s) is a manifestation of individual i’s social power in the
social network, as it is in effect the ability of individual i to
control the outcome of a discussion [16]. The reflected self-
appraisal mechanism therefore describes an individual 1)
observing how much power it had on the discussion of issue
s (the nonnegative quantity ζi(s)) and, 2) for the following
issue s+1, adjusting its self-weight to be equal to this power,
i.e. xi(s+1) = wii(s+1) = ζi(s). As can be observed from
(4) and because C is constant, adjusting wii(s + 1) also
adjusts the interpersonal weights wij(s+ 1).
It is shown in [Lemma 2.2, [9]] that the system (3)
describing the update of self-weights, is equivalent to
x(s+ 1) = F (x(s)) (5)
where the nonlinear vector-valued function F (x(s)) is de-
fined as
F (x(s)) =

ei if xi(s) = ei, for any i
α(x(s))

c1
1−x1(s)
...
cn
1−xn(s)
 otherwise
(6)
with α(x(s)) = 1/
∑n
i=1
ci
1−xi(s) . Much of this paper will
deal with scenarios where the underlying graph has a star
topology or its variants, the definition and relevance of which
are now given.
Definition 1 (Star topology). A strongly connected graph1 G
is said to have star topology if there exists a node i, which
is called the centre node, such that every edge of G is either
to or from node i
Note that the irreducibility of C implies that the star
topology must include edges in both directions between the
centre node vi and every other node vj , j 6= i. We now
provide a lemma and a theorem regarding the convergence
of F (x(s)) as s→∞.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 3.2, [9]). Suppose that n ≥ 3, and
suppose further that G has star topology, which without loss
of generality has centre node v1. Let C be the row-stochastic
and irreducible adjacency matrix, with zero diagonal entries,
associated with G. Then for all initial conditions x(0) ∈ ∆˜n,
the self-weights x(s) converge to the fixed point x∗ = e1 as
s→∞.
1While it is indeed possible to have a star graph that is not strongly
connected, this paper similarly to [9] deals only with graphs which are
strongly connected.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 4.1, [9]). For n ≥ 3, consider the
DeGroot-Friedkin dynamical system (5) with a relative inter-
action matrix C that is row-stochastic, irreducible, and has
zero diagonal entries. Assume that the digraph G associated
with C does not have star topology and define γ> as the
dominant left eigenvector of C. Then,
(i) For all initial conditions x(1) ∈ ∆˜n, the self-weights
x(s) converge to x∗ as s→∞. Here, x∗ ∈ ∆˜n is the
unique fixed point satisfying x∗ = F (x∗).
(ii) There holds x∗i < x
∗
j if and only if γi < γj , for any i, j,
where γi is the ith entry of the dominant left eigenvector
γ. There holds x∗i = x
∗
j if and only if γi = γj .
(iii) The unique fixed point x∗ is determined only by γ>,
and is independent of the initial conditions.
An interpretation of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 is given in
below in Remark 2.
C. Formal Problem Statement
In this paper, we investigate how additional nodes and/or
edges strategically connected to a star topology can change
the social power at equilibrium, x∗. To that end, we begin
first by providing definitions which will aid in describing
our problem and discussing results obtained. Moreover, we
are interested in comparing the social power of individuals
within the network at equilibrium, i.e. when s → ∞. We
will therefore refer to the equilibrium value x∗i as the social
power of individual i when there is no ambiguity (as opposed
to the evolving xi(s) when s <∞).
To simplify the problem, we do not study the evolution
of the opinions y(s, t). Under the assumption that C is irre-
ducible, it is shown in [9] that, for any issue s, the opinions
always converge as limt→∞ y(s, t) = (ζ(s)>y(s, 0))1n. As
discussed above, we are interested in individual social power
of the network.
Definition 2 (Autocratic Network). A social network is said
to be an autocratic configuration, with node vi being the
autocrat, if x(s) = ei.
Definition 3 (Social dominance/leadership). Node vi is said
to be the socially dominant/leader node in the network if
x∗i > x
∗
j for all j 6= i. In other words, at equilibrium, the
social power of individual i is greater than the social power
of any other individual in the social network.
Remark 2 (Autocratic tendency). Lemma 1 has an important
social connotation. One can consider xi(0) as individual i’s
estimate of its social power when the social network is first
formed, before any issue discussion. For any initial estimate
x(0) ∈ ∆˜n (that is, no individual i believes xi(0) = 1), the
star topology network tends to an autocratic configuration
at equilibrium, x∗ = e1. This implies that, for the first few
issues, opinion discussion will occur with everyone contribut-
ing to the final consensus value. However, as more issues
are discussed, the centre individual increasingly guides the
outcome of discussions until, for s = ∞, only the centre
individual’s opinion value matters.
Remark 3. In [9], the constant entries cij of C are termed
“relative interpersonal weights”, and we will keep with this
terminology. However, one can also consider cij as the
amount of “trust” individual i has for individual j or the
strength of “influence” individual j has on individual i. In
other words, cij captures the strength of a unidirectional
relationship (unidirectional since cij 6= cji in general).
For a given graph G with star topology, with centre node
v1, let us call the other nodes subject nodes in the sense that
they are subjects to the autocrat centre node. In Fig. 1, these
are nodes vi, i = 2, ..., 7. We are going to study how the
autocracy can be disrupted by introduction of a perturbation
to the star graph. This leads us to define a new type of node.
An attacker node is a node vj which forms edges eji, eij
with some node vi, i 6= 1, i.e. a subject node. In doing so,
we modify the graph G to become G¯ which is no longer a
star. In Fig. 2, node v8 is the attacker node, forming edges
with node v7. We call node vj an attacker node because,
as will become apparent in the sequel, the weights cji and
cij determine the social power x∗1 of the autocrat node v1.
In other words, vj attacks the social dominance of v1. Note
that two edges, eji, eij must be formed to ensure that G¯
remains strongly connected. Actually, there are a number of
interesting ways to attack the social dominance of v1, and
we list some of the most important/fundamental methods.
For each topology variation we list below, we provide an
example in the Figures 2-6.
Topology Variation 1 (Single Attack). Suppose that n ≥ 4.
Suppose further that G has star topology, with v1 being the
centre node, and with n−2 subject nodes, vi, i = 2, ..., n−1.
A single attacker node vn attaches to subject node vn−1 by
forming edges en−1,n and en,n−1. This forms the modified
graph G¯
Topology Variation 2 (Coordinated Double Attack). Sup-
pose that n ≥ 5. Suppose further that G has star topology,
with v1 being the centre node, and with n − 3 subject
nodes, vi, i = 2, ..., n − 2. Two attacker nodes vn−1 and
vn attach to subject node vn−2 by forming the set of edges
{en−2,n−1, en−1,n−2, en−2,n, en,n−2}. This forms G¯.
Topology Variation 3 (Uncoordinated Double Attack). Sup-
pose that n ≥ 5. Suppose further that G has star topology,
with v1 being the centre node, and with n−3 subject nodes,
vi, i = 2, ..., n − 2. One attacker node vn−1 attaches to
subject node vn−3 with edges en−3,n−1, en−1,n−3. A second
attacker node vn attaches to subject node vn−2 with edges
en−2,n, en,n−2. This forms G¯.
Topology Variation 4 (Two Dissenting Subjects). Suppose
that n ≥ 4. Suppose further that G has star topology, with
v1 being the centre node, and with n − 1 subject nodes,
vi, i = 2, ..., n. There are no attacker nodes. Subject nodes
vn−1 and vn form edges en,n−1, en−1,n, forming G¯.
The following topology variation is motivated by the
concept of a leadership group where two leaders exist, and
seek to maintain their collective social dominance.
Topology Variation 5 (Leadership group). Suppose that G1
and G2 respectively have n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 3 nodes, with
node set V1 = {1, ..., n} and V2 = {n + 1, ..., n + m}
respectively. Both G1 and G2 have star topology; the centre
nodes for G1 and G2 are v1 and vn+1 respectively. Let G¯ be
the graph formed by merging G1 and G2 by insertion of the
edges e1,n+1 and en+1,1. Nodes v1, vn+1 form a leadership
group with subjects v2, ..., vn, vn+2, ..., vn+m.
In the next section, we investigate the above topological
variations of the star graph. Note that Topology Variations 1-
5 have modified graphs G¯ which do not have star topology.
From the properties of F (x(s)) established in [9] and
detailed in Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, it immediately follows
that x∗1 < 1 for all Topology Variations. In other words, v1
is no longer the autocrat but if the perturbation from star
topology (caused by the new edges) is small, one expects
that v1 remains socially dominant. What will we show is that
if the interpersonal weights associated with these new edges
exceed a given threshold, the socially dominant node changes
from v1 to some other node. It is worth emphasising at this
stage that, in Variations 1-3, it is useless for an attacker node
vn to attach to the centre node v1 instead of a subject node;
the topology remains a strongly connected star, and there is
no change in the autocratic nature of v1’s social dominance.
Note that when new edges are introduced, we assume
each individual i adjusts its weights cij to ensure that the
new C is row-stochastic. Take Topology Variation 5 as
an example. Separately, the relative interaction matrix C1
(respectively C2) associated with G1 (respectively G2) is
assumed to be row-stochastic. The relative interaction matrix
C¯ associated with G¯ is also implicitly assumed to be row-
stochastic with zero diagonal. That is, we assume that after
the addition of edges e1,n+1 and en+1,1, adjustments are
made to the original weights c1,j and cn+1,k to ensure C¯ is
row-stochastic.
Remark 4 (Ordering of Social Power). Although Theorem 1
states that x∗ is uniquely determined by γ>, there are no
results available which allow one to analytically compute the
value of x∗ given γ>. What is available is Statement (ii) of
Theorem 1, which states that the ordering x∗i is consistent
with the ordering of γi. In this paper, we are therefore
interested in the ordering of individual social power, as
opposed to the precise values of social power. This is
reflected in Definition 3.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In order to maintain the flow of this paper, and to place
focus on discussion of the social connotations of each result,
we place all proofs in the appendix. We firstly present
theorems and corollaries for each topological variation, and
then discuss their social implications.
A. Topology Variation 1: Single Attacker
Now, firstly consider Topology Variation 1. The relative
interaction matrix C(β) associated with G¯ can be expressed
as
C(β) =

0 c12 c13 . . . c1,n−1 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1− β 0 0 . . . 0 β
0 0 0 . . . 1 0

(7)
where β = cn−1,n ∈ (0, 1) is the influence exerted by
the attacker node vn on subject node vn−1. The following
theorem details how the social power of each individual
changes as β changes.
Theorem 2 (Single Attack). For a social network with
Topology Variation 1, with initial conditions x(0) ∈ ∆˜n,
and described by the DeGroot-Friedkin model, the following
statements are true:
(i) For all values of β ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1, for
all i 6= 1, n− 1, n and x∗n < x∗n−1
(ii) There holds 1) x∗1 > x
∗
i ,∀ i 6= 1 if and only if β <
1− c1,n−1 =
∑n−2
i=2 c1,i, or 2) x
∗
n−1 > x
∗
i ,∀ i 6= n− 1
if and only if β > 1−c1,n−1. There holds x∗1 = x∗n−1 >
x∗i ,∀ i 6= 1, n− 1 if and only if β1 = 1− c1,n−1
(iii) There holds x∗n > x
∗
1 if and only if β > 1/(1+ c1,n−1).
Corollary 1 (Generalised Placement of Single Attacking
Node). Suppose that instead of attaching to subject node
vn−1, attacker node vn can attach to any subject node
vi, i ∈ {2, ..., n − 1} by forming edges en,i, ei,n. The lower
bound on β = cn,i required to have x∗n−1 > x
∗
1 is minimised
if vn attaches to vk where k = argmaxj∈{2,...,n−1} c1,j .
The above mathematical results can be interpreted in the
following social context. From Statement (i), we conclude
that individuals 2 to n−2, i.e. subject nodes vi, i ∈ {2, .., n−
2} will never have greater social power at equilibrium, x∗i
than the centre individual v1 with x∗1, regardless of how
β changes. In addition, the attacker node will never have
greater social power than the subject node vn−1 which it is
attached to.
Recall from Remark 3 that cij can be considered the
trust level accorded to individual j by individual i. Then
according to Statement (ii), centre individual v1 remains the
socially dominant individual in the social network only if
subject vn−1 trusts attacker vn less than the total sum of trust
accorded to subjects vi, i ∈ {2, ..., n−2} by centre node v1.
In order to become socially dominant, and to undermine the
authority of the centre node v1, individual vn−1 must trust
the attacker vn.
Lastly, Statement (iii) reveals that the attacker can also
obtain social power greater the centre individual v1 if β,
i.e. the trust accorded to the attacker vn by subject node
vn−1, is sufficiently large. We therefore conclude that the
leadership/social dominance within a social network with
Topology Variation 1 can be shifted from the original leader
(centre node) to a subject via introduction of a single
attacker and strengthening of the newly formed interpersonal
relationships.
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Fig. 6. Topology Variation 5 (Leadership Group)
with n = m = 4.
Corollary 1 delivers an intuitive and powerful, socially
relevant result. It states that the single attacker node vn
should seek to form an interpersonal relationship with the
subject node vk that centre node v1 trusts the most. This
will minimise the required amount of trust subject vk accords
attacker vn before centre node v1 loses social dominance.
B. Topology Variation 2: Coordinated Double Attack
Consider now Topology Variation 2. Firstly, define β1 =
cn−2,n−1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 = cn−2,n = (0, 1) as the two
adjustable interpersonal weights. Note that because C is
assumed to be row-stochastic, it is implied that β1 + β2 +
cn−2,1 = 1 which in turn implies β1 + β2 < 1 because
cn−2,1 > 0. We omit displaying the exact form of C(β1, β2)
due to spatial limitations.
Theorem 3 (Coordinated Double Attack). For a social
network with Topology Variation 2, with initial conditions
x(0) ∈ ∆˜n, and described by the DeGroot-Friedkin model,
the following statements are true:
(i) For all β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1 for all
i 6= 1, n− 2, n− 1, n, and x∗n, x∗n−1 < x∗n−2.
(ii) There holds 1) x∗1 > x
∗
i ,∀, i 6= 1 if and only if β1+β2 <
1−c1,n−2 =
∑n−3
i=2 c1,i, or 2) x
∗
n−2 > x
∗
i ,∀, i 6= n−2 if
and only if β1+β2 > 1−c1,n−2. There holds x∗1 = x∗n−2
if and only if β1 + β2 = 1− c1,n−2.
(iii) There holds x∗n > x
∗
1 (respectively x
∗
n−1 > x
∗
1) if and
only if β2 > (1 − β1)/(1 + c1,n−2) (respectively β1 >
(1− β2)/(1 + c1,n−2) ).
(iv) There holds x∗n−1 < x
∗
n or x
∗
n−1 > x
∗
n if and only if
β1 < β2 or β1 > β2 respectively. If β1 = β2, then
x∗n−1 = x
∗
n.
Corollary 2 (Generalised Placement of Coordinated Double
Attack). Suppose that instead of attaching to subject node
vn−2, attacker nodes vn−1, vn can attach to any subject
node vi, i ∈ {2, ..., n − 2} by forming the set of edges
{en−1,i, ei,n−1, en,i, ei,n}. The lower bound on β1 + β2 =
cn−1,i+cn,i required to have x∗n−2 > x
∗
1 is minimised if vn−1
and vn attach to vk where k = argmaxj∈{2,...,n−2} c1,j .
Due to spatial limitations, we discuss social implications
of Theorem 3 only if the conclusions differ significantly from
the discussion in the previous subsection.
The key result is Statement (ii), which indicates that the
combined trust given to attackers vn−1 and vn by subject
node vn−2 must exceed the combined trust given to subjects
v2, ..., vn−3 by centre node v1, in order for centre node v1 to
lose social dominance (and thus subject vn−2 becomes the
socially dominant individual). It is most interesting to note
that it is only the sum of the trust/influence β1 + β2 that
is relevant, and there is no requirement on the individual
magnitudes of β1, β2.
Regarding Statement (iii), we observe that the inequality,
which if satisfied ensures that attacker vn has social power
greater than centre v1, is a function of β1, β2 and c1,n−2. As
detailed in the proof in Appendix B, there always exists a
β1, β2 satisfying β1 + β2 < 1 which ensures both attacker
nodes vn−1, vn have social power greater than the centre v1.
C. Topology Variation 3: Uncoordinated Double Attack
Define β1 = cn−3,n−1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 = cn−2,n ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 4. For a social network with Topology Variation 3,
with initial conditions x(0) ∈ ∆˜n, and described by the
DeGroot-Friedkin model, the following statements are true:
(i) For all values of β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n−4}, and x∗n−1 < x∗n−3 and x∗n <
x∗n−2.
(ii) There holds x∗1 > x
∗
i for all i 6= 1 if and only if
β1 < 1−c1,n−3 and β2 < 1−c1,n−2. If β1 > 1−c1,n−3
(respectively β2 > 1 − c1,n−2), then x∗n−3 > x∗1
(respectively x∗n−2 > x
∗
1).
(iii) For i ∈ {1, 2}, there holds x∗n−2+i > x∗1 if and only if
βi > 1/(1 + c1,n−4+i).
(iv) There holds x∗n−3 > x
∗
n−2 if and only if
1−β2
1−β1 >
c1,n−2
c1,n−3
.
Equivalently, x∗n−3 > x
∗
n−2 if and only if
c1,n−3
cn−3,1
>
c1,n−2
cn−2,1
The most interesting conclusion drawn from Theorem 4 is
when we compare to Theorem 3 which concerns Topology
Variation 2. With Topology Variation 2, for the centre indi-
vidual v1 to lose its social dominance we require the sum
of the trust values β1 + β2 to exceed a lower bound, and
there are no separate lower bounding inequalities for β1 or
β2. With Topology Variation 3, centre individual v1 loses
social dominance if and only if either β1 or β2 exceed their
respective lower bounding inequalities. Importantly, these
two lower bounding inequalities are independent of each
other. This clearly points to the fact that a coordinated attack
on the social dominance of the centre node is more desirable,
an idea which is socially intuitive.
From Statement (iii), both attacker nodes have larger social
power than the centre node if and only if β1 > 1/(1 +
c1,n−3) and β2 > 1/(1 + c1,n−2), which implies that β1 +
β2 > 1/(1 + c1,n−3) + 1/(1 + c1,n−2). From Statement (iii)
Theorem 3, with Topology Variation 2, both attacker nodes
have larger social power than the centre node if and only if
β2 > (1−β1)/(1+ c1,n−2) and β1 > (1−β2)/(1+ c1,n−2),
which implies that β1 +β2 > 2/(2+c1,n−2). Since both 1+
c1,n−2 and 1 + c1,n−3 are smaller than 2 + c1,n−2, it follows
that 1/(1+c1,n−3)+1/(1+c1,n−2) > 2/(2+c1,n−2), which
implies that a coordinated attack on the social dominance
of the centre node is also more efficient for the attackers.
D. Topology Variation 4: Two Dissenting Subjects
Topology Variation 4 is different to the ones studied above
in the sense that there are no attacker nodes. Instead, one
can consider this variation as one where two subjects form
a relationship in dissent from the leader. Firstly, let β1 =
cn−1,n ∈ (0, 1) and β2 = cn,n−1 ∈ (0, 1). Analysis yields
the following result.
Theorem 5 (Two Dissenting Subjects). For a social network
with Topology Variation 4, with initial conditions x(s) ∈ ∆˜n,
and described by the DeGroot-Friedkin model, the following
statements are true:
(i) For all β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1 for all
i 6= 1, n− 1, n.
(ii) There holds x∗n > x
∗
1 if and only if β1 > (1 −
c1,n)/(c1,n−1 + β2) with β1 ∈ (0, 1). There exists such
a β1 ∈ (0, 1) only if β2 >
∑n−2
i=2 c1,i.
(iii) There holds x∗n−1 > x
∗
1 if and only if β2 > (1 −
c1,n−1)/(c1,n + β1) with β2 ∈ (0, 1). There exists such
a β2 ∈ (0, 1) only if β1 >
∑n−2
i=2 c1,i.
(iv) There holds x∗n < x
∗
n−1 if and only if β2 > β1c1,n +
c1,n−1(c1,n − 1) or equivalently β1 < (β2 + cn−1(1−
c1,n))
Note that the inequality in statement (ii) can be rewritten
as β2 > (1− c1,n − β1c1,n−1)/β1 with β2 ∈ (0, 1) which is
satisfiable only if β1 > (1 − c1,n)/(1 + c1,n−1). Similarly,
the inequality in statement (iii) is equivalent to β1 > (1 −
c1,n−1 − β2c1,n)/β2 with β1 ∈ (0, 1) which is satisfiable
only if β2 > (1− c1, n− 1)/(1 + c1,n).
We now interpret Statement (ii), which we believe is the
key result of the theorem. A similar conclusion can be drawn
for Statement (iii) but we omit this due to spatial limitations.
In order to make centre node v1 lose social dominance, the
dissent subject nodes vn−1 and vn must adopt a cooperative
strategy. From their definitions, we can interpret β1 as the
trust given by vn−1 to vn while β2 is the trust given by vn to
vn−1. A necessary condition for individual vn to have social
power greater than centre node v1 is that β2 >
∑n−2
i=2 c1,i.
This means that not only must vn−1 trust vn sufficiently (as
given by the inequality β1 > (1− c1,n)/(c1,n−1 + β2)), but
individual vn must reciprocate by ensuring that it trusts vn−1
sufficiently (β1 >
∑n−2
i=2 c1,i). Unless the two dissenting
nodes build a cooperative and sufficiently strong bilateral
relationship, centre node v1 will remain socially dominant.
E. Topology Variation 5: Leadership Group
With β1 = c1,n+1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 = cn+1,1 ∈ (0, 1), the
following result is obtained
Theorem 6. For a social network with Topology Variation 5,
with initial conditions x(s) ∈ ∆˜n+m, and described by the
DeGroot-Friedkin model, the following statements are true:
(i) For all β1 ∈ (0, 1) and for all β2 ∈ (0, 1) there holds
x∗i < x
∗
1 and x
∗
k < x
∗
n+1 for i ∈ {2, ..., n} and k ∈
{n+ 2, ..., n+m}.
(ii) There holds x∗1 < x
∗
n+1 or x
∗
1 > x
∗
n+1 if and only if
β2 < β1 or β2 > β1 respectively. If β1 = β2, then
x∗1 = x
∗
n+1.
(iii) For k ∈ {n+ 2, ..., n+m} there holds x∗k > x∗1 if and
only if cn+1,k(β1/β2) > 1. For i ∈ {2, ..., n}, holds
x∗i > x
∗
n+1 if and only if c1,i(β2/β1) > 1.
Statement (ii) shows that the ratio of β1/β2 determines
whether centre node v1 or centre node vn+1 is socially
dominant. Statement (iii) delivers a surprising and interesting
result on how leaders can cooperatively protect themselves
and maintain collective social dominance. Let i ∈ {2, ..., n}
and k ∈ {n+ 1, ..., n+m}. Consider from centre individual
v1’s point of view. While x∗i < x
∗
1 is guaranteed, in order
to ensure that v1 has greater social power than subject vk
(i.e. subjects of centre individual vn+1), individual v1 must
ensure that cn+1,k(β1/β2) < 1. This inequality always holds,
regardless of the value of cn+1,k < 1, if β1 = β2. I.e. if the
trust level v1 accords to vn+1 is equal to the trust level vn+1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
V a
l u
e
 
o
f  x
i a
t  E
q u
i l i b
r i u
m
,
 
x i*
β1 = c78
 
 
Center Node v1
Subject v2
Subject v7
Attacker v8
Fig. 7. Simulation of Topology Variation 1 with n = 8.
accords to v1, regardless of the magnitude of β1 = β2, v1
has greater social power than all subject nodes including the
subjects of vn+1. It can appear to be surprising because this
holds even if cn+1,k >> β1, β2. Yet such a result is intuitive
if we consider β1/β2 as the ratio of the trust v1 places on
vn+1 (and indirectly the trust v1 places on subject vk) versus
the trust vn+1 places on v1 (and indirectly the trust vk places
on v1).
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we provide 2 short simulations to highlight
some of our most interesting results. We do not provide
comprehensive simulations for each Topology Variation due
to spatial limitations.
Firstly, we simulate Topology Variation 1 as it is the
fundamental strategy, with n = 8. The top row of the
matrix C is given by [0, 0.15, 0.15, 0.2, 0.05, 0.15, 0.3, 0].
Figure 7 shows the social power at equilibrium x∗i , for
selected individuals, as a function of β = c78. Centre v1 loses
social dominance when β > 0.7 as stated in Theorem 2.
Next, we simulate Topology Variation 4 to show the
need for cooperation between two dissenting individuals in
order to displace the centre node. The top row of C is
[0, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05, 0.2, 0.3]. Figure 8 shows the
social power at equilibrium x∗i , for selected individuals as
a function of β1 = c78 when β2 = 0.49 (i.e. when β2 <∑n−2
i=2 c1,i). In accordance with Theorem 5, Statement (ii),
dissent subject v8 never achieves social power greater than
centre v1 because there does not exist a β1 ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying the required inequality. Figure 9 shows the same
simulation scenario but now with β2 = 0.55 >
∑n−2
i=2 c1,i.
In accordance with Statement (ii) of Theorem 5, x∗8 > x
∗
1
when β1 > 0.93.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Social networks with a star topology converge to an
autocratic configuration, with the centre individual holding
all the social power, as the number of issues discussed tend
towards infinity. This paper proposed a number of different
strategies, involving introduction of new individuals and/or
new interpersonal relationships into the social network, in
order to move social dominance from the centre individual
to a subject individual. Necessary and sufficient conditions
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
V a
l u
e
 
o
f  x
i a
t  E
q u
i l i b
r i u
m
,
 
x i*
β1 = c78
 
 
Center Node v1
Subject v2
Dissent Subject v7
Dissent Subject v8
Fig. 8. Simulation of Topology Variation 4 with n = 8, when β2 <∑n−2
i=2 c1,i.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
X: 0.9306
Y: 0.3348
V a
l u
e
 
o
f  x
i a
t  E
q u
i l i b
r i u
m
,
 
x i*
β1 = c78
Center Node v1
Subject v2
Dissent Subject v7
Dissent Subject v8
Fig. 9. Simulation of Topology Variation 4 with n = 8, when β2 >∑n−2
i=2 c1,i.
are developed, and interpretation of these conditions showed
the strategies are sociologically intuitive. Numerous future
directions exist. Firstly, we wish to generalise the results
on uncoordinated attack and coordinated attack to arbitrary
numbers of attacker nodes. Different leadership groups, and
dissent topologies will also be explored. We also wish to
investigate whether such straightforward strategies exist for
more general topologies, and lastly we shall study strategies
concerning social power for a subgroup of individuals.
APPENDIX
PROOFS FOR SECTION III
In the following proofs, we make extensive use of The-
orem 1, and in particular Statement (ii), which states that
x∗i > x
∗
j ⇔ γi > γj and that x∗i = x∗j ⇔ γi = γj .
A. Theorem 2 and Corollary 1
The expression γ> = γ>C, where C is given in (7),
allows us to obtain
γ1 =
n−2∑
i=2
γi + (1− β)γn−1 (8a)
γi = c1iγ1, ∀ i 6= 1, n− 1, n (8b)
γn−1 = c1,n−1γ1 + γn (8c)
γn = βγn−1 (8d)
Statement (i) is obtained from (8b), where we conclude γi <
γ1 because c1i < 1 for all i 6= 1, n − 1, n, and from (8d),
which allows us to conclude that γn < γn−1 for all β ∈
(0, 1). For Statement (ii), begin by substituting γn from (8d)
into (8c), which yields γn−1 = c1,n−1γ1 + βγn−1. This is
rearranged to obtain
γ1 =
1− β
c1,n−1
γn−1 (9)
Recalling that 0 < c1,n−1 and 0 < β < 1, it follows that
γ1 < γn−1 if and only if β > 1 − c1,n−1. Similarly, one
can obtain that γ1 > γn if and only if β < 1/(1 + c1,n−1),
which proves Statement (iii). Corollary 1 is a generalisation
of Statement (ii) obtained by observing that argminj(1 −
c1,j) = argmaxjc1,j . 
B. Theorem 3 and Corollary 2
For Topology Variation 2, the relative interaction matrix
C is given by
C(β) =

0 c12 c13 . . . c1,n−1 0 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
1− (β1 + β2) 0 0 . . . 0 β1 β2
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 0
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 0

(10)
From γ>C = γ>, we obtain
γ1 =
n−3∑
i=2
γi + (1− β1 − β2)γn−2 (11a)
γi = c1iγ1, ∀ i 6= 1, n− 2, n− 1, n (11b)
γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1 + γn−1 + γn (11c)
γn−1 = β1γn−2 (11d)
γn = β2γn−2 (11e)
Statement (i) is obtained from (11a) and (11d) and (11e),
using the same arguments as the proof for Theorem 2.
Regarding Statement (ii), substitute (11d) and (11e) into
(11c) and rearrange to obtain γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1/(1−β1−β2).
The statement is then straightforwardly obtained. For State-
ment (iii), in regards to γn, substitute γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1/(1−
β1 − β2) into the right hand side of (11e) to obtain γn =
β2c1,n−2γ1/(1−β1−β2). It is straightforward to verify that
β2 > (1−β1)/(1+c1,n−2) implies β2c1,n−2/(1−β1−β2) >
1, which in turn implies γn > γ1. The inequality that ensures
γn−1 > γ1 can be similarly found. Observe that 1−β1 < 1,
1 − β2 < 1 and 1 < 1 + c1,n−2. There must also hold
β1 + β2 < 1. This implies that for any value c1,n−2, there
always exist β1, β2 which ensures γn−1 > γ1 and γn > γ1.
Regarding Statement (iv), from (11d) and (11e), we have
γn−1/γn = β1/β2. The statement is then straightforwardly
obtained. Corollary 2 is a generalisation of Statement (ii) by
observing that argminj(1− c1,j) = argmaxjc1,j .
C. Theorem 4
The relative interaction matrix is given by
C(β1, β2) =

0 c1,2 · · · c1,n−3 c1,n−2 0 0
1 0 · · · 0 0 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
1− β1 0 · · · 0 0 β1 0
1− β2 0 · · · 0 0 0 β2
0 0 · · · 1 0 0 0
0 0 · · · 0 1 0 0

(12)
and the equation γ>C = γ> yields the following equalities:
γ1 = (1− β1)γn−3 + (1− β2)γn−2 +
n−4∑
i=2
γi (13a)
γi = ciγ1, i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 4} (13b)
γn−3 = c1,n−3γ1 + γn−1 (13c)
γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1 + γn (13d)
γn−1 = β1γn−3 (13e)
γn = β2γn−2 (13f)
From (13b), since c1,i ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 4},
it follows that γi < γ0 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n−4}. From (13e)
and (13f), since β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), it follows that γn−1 < γn−3
and γn < γn−2. Thus, statement (i) is true.
From (13c) and (13e), we have γn−3γ1 =
c1,n−3
1−β1 , which
implies that γ1 > γn−3 if and only if β1 < 1 − c1,n−3.
Similarly, from (13d) and (13f), we have γ1 > γn−2 if and
only if β2 < 1−c1,n−2. It is then straightforward to conclude
that for i ∈ {1, 2}, if βi > 1− c1,n−4+i, then x∗n−4+i > x∗1.
Therefore, statement (ii) is true.
From (13c) and (13e), we have γn−1γ1 =
β1c1,n−3
1−β1 . It follows
that γn−1 > γ1 if and only if β1 > 1/(1+c1,n−3). Similarly,
from (13d) and (13f), we have γn > γ1 if and only if β2 >
1/(1 + c1,n−2). Thus, statement (iii) is true.
Since γn−3γ1 =
c1,n−3
1−β1 and
γn−2
γ1
=
c1,n−2
1−β2 , it follows that
γn−3(1−β1)/c1,n−3 = γn−2(1−β2)/c1,n−2, which implies
that γn−3γn−2 =
c1,n−3(1−β2)
c1,n−2(1−β1) . Then, γn−3 > γn−2 if and only if
1−β2
1−β1 >
c1,n−2
c1,n−3
. Therefore, statement (iv) is true.
D. Theorem 5
For Topology Variation 4, the relative interaction matrix
C is expressed as
C(β1, β2) =

0 c12 c13 . . . c1,n−1 c1,n
1 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1− β1 0 0 . . . 0 β1
1− β2 0 0 0 β2 0

(14)
where β1 = cn−1,n and β2 = cn,n−1. The expression
γ>C = γ> yields the following equalities
γ1 =
n−2∑
i=2
γi + (1− β1)γn−1 + (1− β2)γn (15a)
γi = c1iγ1, ∀ i 6= 1, n− 1, n (15b)
γn−1 = c1,n−1γ1 + β2γn (15c)
γn = c1,nγ1 + β1γn−1 (15d)
Again, Statement (i) is obtained trivially from (15b). Substi-
tute (15c) into (15d) and rearrange for γn to obtain
γn =
(
c1,n + β1c1,n−1
1− β1β2
)
γ1 (16)
and it follows that γn > γ1 is implied by
c1,n + β1c1,n−1 > 1− β1β2 (17)
β1 >
1− c1,n
c1,n−1 + β2
(18)
β2 >
1− c1,n − c1,n−1β1
β1
(19)
Consider (18). Observe that (1− c1,n)/(c1,n−1 +β2) ≥ 1⇔
1 − c1,n − c1,n−1 ≥ β2 ⇔
∑n−2
i=2 c1,i ≥ β2. Recalling that
β1 ∈ (0, 1), we conclude γn > γ1 is possible only if β2 >∑n−2
i=2 c1,i. Alternatively, one can consider (19) and similarly
derive that γn > γ1 if β2 > (1 − c1,n − β1c1,n−1)/β1 and
β1 > (1− c1,n)/(1 + c1,n−1). The inequality conditions for
ensuring γn−1 > γ1 are also derived in similar manner and
omitted due to spatial limitations.
E. Theorem 6
The relative interaction matrix for Topology Variation 5 is
given by
C(β1, β2)
=

0 c12 c13 . . . β1 0 . . . 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
β2 0 0 . . . 0 cn+1,n+2 . . . cn+1,n
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0

(20)
And the expression γ>C = γ> yields the following equal-
ities
γ1 =
∑
1<i≤n
γi + β2γn+1 (21a)
γi = c1,iγ1, ∀ i ∈ {2, ..., n} (21b)
γn+1 =
∑
n+1<i≤n+m
γi + β1γ1 (21c)
γi = cn+1,iγn+1, ∀ i ∈ {n+ 2, ..., n+m} (21d)
Statement (i) is obtained trivially from (21b) and (21d). In
regards to Statement (ii), first substitute (21b) into (21a) to
obtain γ1 = β2γn+1 +
∑
1<i≤n c1,iγ1 which is rearranged
to yield γ1(1−
∑
1<i≤n c1,i) = β2γn+1 which is equivalent
to β1γ1 = β2γn+1 because 1 −
∑
1<i≤n c1,i = β1. State-
ment (iii) is obtained by substituting γ1 = β2γn+1/β1 into
(21d).
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